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ABSTRACT 
 
Safety issues concerning the use of large lithium-ion batteries in electrified vehicles are discussed 
based on abuse test results of lithium-ion cells together with safety devices for cells. The presented 
abuse tests are; propane fire test, external heating test (oven), overcharge and short circuit. It was 
found that in a fire, cells with higher state of charge (SOC) gave a higher heat release rate (HRR) 
while the total heat release (THR) had a lower correlation with SOC. One fire test resulted in a 
hazardous projectile from a cylindrical cell. Toxic gas emissions of hydrogen fluoride (HF) were 
measured in the fire tests and it was found that the total amount of HF released increased with lower 
SOC. 
 
KEYWORDS: lithium-ion battery, electrified vehicle, safety, thermal runaway, fire, toxic 
gases 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The lithium-ion (Li-ion) battery technology can enable a broad introduction of electrified vehicles 
mainly due to its high energy capacity. Li-ion batteries also have other important properties, e.g. long 
life time and the possibility of fast charging. However, lithium-ion batteries have a drawback 
compared to most other battery technologies in that the electrolyte is flammable and the battery may 
go into a thermal runaway, that is, the battery may self-heat, resulting in a rapid pressure and 
temperature increase in the cell, which will release flammable and toxic gases but can also cause 
projectiles and fire [1-2]. This may happen moving out of the stable operating window of the Li-ion 
cell and can be caused by e.g. short circuiting, overheating, overcharging or mechanical damage. 
 
Lithium-ion batteries are used in very large numbers for consumer products like cell phones, laptop 
computers etc. Incidents have happened with these batteries but the consequences are in most cases 
not that serious due to the limited size of the batteries. With the increased number of electric vehicles 
on the roads the safety issues of the lithium-ion technology have become more important taking into 
consideration the large size of the batteries in automotive applications. Incidents involving electric 
vehicles have indeed happened some of them resulting in fires. But luckily these fires have not 
resulted in any more serious consequences yet. 
 
One example is three car fires involving the battery electric vehicle (BEV) Tesla Model S that 
occurred in 2013. In two of them the driver hit road debris at highway speed while one was caused by 
a crash into a concrete barrier and a tree resulting in significant deformations. The first fire was a 
result of penetration from beneath of the battery pack. Mass media attention was high regarding these 
incidents and the fires made the stock price of Tesla to decrease. Anyhow, compared to the annual 
average number of automobile fires in the USA, of the order of 1/1000 automobiles [3], the number of 
car fires in Tesla Model S (estimated as 1/10000 cars) is significantly lower. This comparison does 
not take into account the age of the cars involved, older cars may be more prone to fires, but it still 
shows that the risks involving electric vehicles should not be overstated. National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) investigated the fires and did not find any defect trends [4] but Tesla 
did voluntarily chose to reinforce the underbody of their cars by arming plates [5] in order to lower 
the frequency and the effect of hitting road debris.  
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Other incidents include the Fisker Karma plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV). In October 2012 
hurricane Sandy caused flooding of a harbor in Newark, New Jersey. The flooding lasted several 
hours and thereafter 16 brand new Fisker Karma were destroyed by fire. The cars were completely 
covered with salt water during the flooding, an extreme situation where electrical short circuits are 
likely to occur. Again mass media attention was high even though other vehicles including other 
PHEV/HEV also burnt. Prior to hurricane Sandy some other fires incidents occurred involving Fisker 
Karma, one of them outside a supermarket shortly after the driver left the car. Fisker Karma is now no 
longer produced, possible partly due to the fire problems but also due to other causes. These incidents 
are examples where electric vehicle fires have been in the focus of the mass media. Other fires have 
happened, during charging or as spontaneous fires, but have not gained as much media interest. The 
fires and their consequences clearly demonstrate the necessity of putting safe vehicles on the market, 
not only for the safety of humans in or near the vehicles but also for economical and environmental 
reasons.  
 
The electrified vehicle (xEV) has a potential to be safer than conventional combustion engine cars, 
simply because the main fire source, gasoline/diesel is removed [6]. Anyhow, the safety of a battery 
system depends on several things, e.g. cell chemistry, cell design and system design, including 
thermal management system and control strategies. Common cathode chemistries contain cobalt, e.g. 
lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), LiCoO2, lithium nickel manganese cobalt (NMC), LiNixMnyCozO2, and 
lithium nickel cobalt aluminum (NCA), LiNixCoyAlzO2. Lithium phosphates [7] are also used, e.g. 
lithium iron phosphate (LFP), LiFePO4. For the anode, various forms of carbons are dominant while 
lithium titanate oxide (LTO), Li4Ti5O12, is used in lower volumes. This paper focuses mainly on 
carbon-LFP cells which are seen currently as state of the art on the market when it comes to safety, 
although many battery systems for automotive applications use less stable chemistries in order to 
obtain e.g. higher energy density. Abuse test results from cell level are presented and their impact is 
discussed on battery system and vehicle level. 
 
CELLS STUDIED 
 
Cylindrical cells as well as pouch and soft-can prismatic cells have been tested. In the pouch cell, the 
layers are stacked on top of each other and sealed by an aluminum-polymer bag. The pouch cell is 
often called a coffee bag cell or a polymer cell. Figure 1 shows an X-ray photo of the EiG pouch cell. 
The layered structure is clearly visible, where the white/grey colored layers are the separator material. 
 
 
Figure 1 X-ray photo of EiG pouch cell seen at one of the edges. 
 
Table 1 shows the cells and their specifications for the abuse tests presented in this paper. Most of the 
cells have a LFP-cathode and a carbon based anode as seen from Table 1. The initial state of charge 
(SOC) level of the cells was achieved by charge/discharge procedures using a Digatron battery test 
equipment or an ordinary laboratory power aggregate. The cells had not been used prior to the 
measurements but had different calendar ageing. The EiG and Lifetech cells had approximately 2-3 
years of calendar aging while the European Battery cells were less than 6 months old and the 
Samsung, EVE and GBS cells were about 1 year old. Cylindrical cells of type 18650, i.e. 18 mm in 
diameter and 65 mm long, are produced in very large volumes and are traditionally used in laptops. 
Besides the use of 18650 cells in laptops, Tesla Motors has chosen the 18650 cell format as a basis for 
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its serial-production of electric vehicles, while other vehicle manufacturers have chosen the prismatic 
or pouch cell type. Panasonic is the cell supplier for the Model S battery which uses cells with NCA 
as cathode material [8]. 
 
Table 1 Cell and test specifications. 
Cell 
Nominal 
cell 
capacity 
(Ah) 
Nominal 
cell 
voltage 
(V) 
Cathode/ 
anode 
Cell 
packaging 
Test type 
presented in 
paper 
Initial 
SOC 
(%) 
EiG ePLB-
F007A 
7 3.2 LFP/carbon Pouch propane fire, 
overcharge 
0-100 
100 
Lifetech X-1P 8 3.3 LFP/carbon Cylindrical propane fire 100 
European Battery 45 3.2 LFP/carbon Pouch short circuit, 
overcharge 
100 
100 
Samsung 
ICR18650-24F 
2.4 3.6 Cobalt 
based/carbon 
Cylindrical External 
heating (oven) 
100 
EVE F7568270 10 3.2 LFP/carbon pouch overcharge 100 
GBS LFMP40Ah 40 3.2 LFMP/carbon prismatic overcharge 100 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Photo of tested cells, not same physical scale. 
 
 
THERMAL RUNAWAY 
 
The thermal runaway was studied by external heating abuse test for a commercial 18650 laptop cell. 
The cell is produced in large quantities by Samsung. The cell was fastened to a brick and placed 
inside a thermostatically controlled oven, Binder FED 115, and heated up in about 1 hour to the 
thermal runaway temperature. The cell voltage and the cell surface temperature (measured by four 
type K thermocouples) as well as the oven air temperature (measured with one type K thermocouple) 
were measured with 1 Hz. Figure 3 shows the cell voltage and the differential temperature, ∆T, as a 
function of the oven temperature. The differential temperature is the difference between the average 
cell surface temperature and the oven temperature. Before the thermal runaway the cell voltage 
breakdown occurs due to melting of the separator, an endothermic process which is observable as a 
small local decrease of ∆T. ∆T has negative values up to 220 °C due to higher oven temperature than 
cell temperature, while the thermal runaway occurs at 220 °C. The cell surface temperature increases 
to close to 800 °C (∆T above 500 °C), with a maximum rate of around 5000 °C/min. Observations 
from the video recording showed that the thermal runaway is accompanied with a pressure wave and 
instant ignition. The duration of the fire is approximate 1 minute. 
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Figure 3 External heating test of a Samsung 18650 laptop cell. 
 
 
FIRE CHARATERISTICS ON CELL LEVEL 
 
The fire tests were conducted using the measurement and gas collection system of a Single Burning 
Item (SBI) apparatus that is normally used for classification of building materials according to the 
European Classification scheme EN13823 [9]. The experimental setup is shown in Figure 4. The 
battery cells were placed on a wire grating. A 15 kW propane burner was placed underneath the cells 
and was ignited two minutes after the start of the test. 
 
 
Figure 4 Schematic illustration of the experimental setup. 
 
Tests were performed on EiG and Lifetech cells. Five cells were tested at the same time. The EiG 
cells were fastened together with steel wire while the Lifetech cells were placed inside a protection 
box made of walls of non-combustible silica board and steel net at the bottom and top. Additionally, a 
secondary layer of steel net was used at the top nailed to the wire grating to protect from hazardous 
projectiles, see Figure 5. A blank test was conducted at the beginning of each test day in order to be 
able to subtract the burner influence on the heat release rate (HRR) values and to make a blank for the 
gas analysis. HRR values were calculated by the oxygen consumption method and corrected for CO2 
[9]. The fire emissions from the test object were collected in a duct flow. In the tests of EiG cells with 
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100% SOC a duct flow of 0.6 m3/s was used but in order to increase emission concentrations in the 
ventilation duct the flow was decreased to 0.4 m3/s for the other tests of EiG cells and for the Lifetech 
cells. All tests were video recorded. A heated (180 °C) sub-flow was taken out to an FTIR, Thermo 
Scientific Antaris IGS analyzer (Nicolet), with a gas cell (heated to 180 °C), that measured gases, e.g. 
hydrogen fluoride (HF). Each test used a fresh primary filter (heated to 180 °C) which was analysed 
for fluoride content after the test. All fluoride found was assumed to be in the form of HF. For a 
detailed description of the experiment, see Andersson et al. [10]. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Lifetech single cells before the fire test at 100% SOC with external propane burner. 
 
The heat release rate for various SOC levels for a five-cell-pack of EiG cells is shown in Figure 6. A 
strong dependence between SOC and HRR can be observed and lower SOC values result in lower 
heat release rate peaks. For 100% SOC there are rapid heat releases, outbursts, one per cell, while no 
outburst or HRR peak can be seen for cells with lower SOC. For an example of an outburst see Figure 
7. The total heat release (THR) has a relatively low dependence on SOC and was roughly 8 MJ for the 
five-cell-pack, corresponding to 6.5 MJ/kg battery. Ribière et al. [11] found, based on a 11 Wh pouch 
cell with LiMn2O4 (LMO) cathode, a heat of combustion of 4 MJ/kg, which is in the same order as 
that measured in our study. 
 
 
Figure 6 Heat release rate for the five-cell-pack of EiG 7 Ah cell, using an external propane 
burner (burner HRR has been subtracted from the graph). Cell SOC varied from 0% to 
100%. 
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Figure 7 Photo in the beginning (left) of the fire test of a 100% SOC EiG five-cell-pack and photo 
of an outburst (right) during the fire test. 
 
The nominal energy content of the five-cell-pack is 112 Wh. Electrified vehicles typically have 10-30 
kWh of batteries and an extrapolation of our values to the energy released for this size of battery pack  
gives a THR of 700 - 2100 MJ, which corresponds to a fire of about 20-50 liter of gasoline. 
 
PROJECTILE HAZARDS 
 
Batteries can also cause projectile risks which was demonstrated in one of the fire tests. Even though 
the cells were equipped with a safety valve this did not prevent the explosion of one of the five 
Lifetech cylindrical cells as shown in Figure 8. Material from the cell interior was expelled while the 
cell moved backwards with a clear bang and a pressure wave forming a crater in the bed of small 
stones in the propane burner. No visual flaws of any kind could be observed for any of the five 
Lifetech cells before the test. A simple tear-down was conducted but no indications were found to 
understand why that cell exploded. Figure 9 shows photos during tear-down. No separator could be 
observed in the cell, which was expected due to the high fire temperatures. The positive current 
collector of aluminum foil seemed to have melted completely. The copper foil was still present. The 
weight loss of the cell was 27%. 
 
   
Figure 8 Photos of the exploded Lifetech cell, after the fire test at 100% SOC with external 
propane burner. 
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Figure 9 Photos of the exploded Lifetech cell during tear-down. 
 
CELL VENTILATION AND TOXIC GASES 
 
The gases released from a Li-ion battery cell can be toxic, e.g.  CO, but the fluoride emissions are of 
most concern. Hydrogen fluoride (HF) is one of them, but there are also others, e.g. phosphorous 
oxyfluoride (POF3). They are formed from the fluorine content used in the Li-ion cell, the binder (e.g. 
PVdF) and the commonly used Li-salt, hexafluorophosphate (LiPF6). The reaction formulas for the 
salt decomposition can be seen in the following equations [12]. 
 
 LiPF6 → LiF + PF5       (1) 
 
 PF5 + H2O → POF3 + 2HF      (2) 
 
 LiPF6 + H2O → LiF + POF3 + 2HF     (3) 
 
HF has a relatively well-known toxicity [13] while the toxicity of POF3 is unknown. However, POF3 
might be even more toxic than HF as in the case of the chlorine analogue POCl3/HCl [14]. POF3 could 
not be observed in the fire tests on Li-ion cells reported here. A fire study on electrolytes in a Cone 
calorimeter by Andersson et al. [10] indicated that the POF3 production might be approximately 1:20 
of the HF production, which indicates that POF3 may have been released also in the present tests but 
the concentration was below the detection limit (6 ppm). Figure 10 shows the real-time HF production 
rate for EiG cells with different SOC during the fire tests. The highest rate is for 50% SOC while 
100% SOC has the lowest rate. The total amount of HF from both FTIR and the sampling filter is 
shown in Table 2 and values are between 4.9-13.9 g HF for a five-cell-pack. Ribière et al. [11] 
measured HF in their studies of another type of pouch cell and if we normalize their values against the 
cell electrical energy we obtain 37-69 mg/Wh, with the higher HF amounts for lower SOC. These 
amounts are in the same order as our results, 50-120 mg/Wh, however, in contrast to our study, 
Ribière et al. [11] found the highest HF production rate for the fully charged (100% SOC) cells.  
 
Table 2 Emissions of hydrogen fluoride for 0%, 50% and 100 % SOC. 
SOC (%) Max rate of HF production (mg/s) 
Total amounts of 
HF (g) 
Total amount of HF (mg/Wh) 
Our 
measurements 
Calculated from 
Ribière et al. [11] 
100 8.3 5.6 50 37 
50 16 14 120 39 
0 10 11 100 69 
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Extrapolation of our data to a larger battery pack size typically used in electrified vehicles gives an 
indication of the potential amount of released HF. A battery pack for an electrified vehicle, based on 
the tested EiG cell, could, for example, have 432 cells. This corresponds to 108 cells in series and four 
cells in parallel which results in a battery pack with 9.7 kWh and 346 V nominal voltage. The 
extrapolation factor is then 432/5 = 86.4, resulting in 400-1200 g HF depending on the SOC level. 
These values are in the same order of magnitude as those reported by Lecocq et al. [15] for fire tests 
on a complete electric vehicle. 
 
 
Figure 10 The rate of HF production for a EiG five-cell pack for 0%, 50% and 100% SOC. 
  
CELL SAFETY MECHANISMS 
 
Cylindrical 18650 cells for consumer products typically have a cobalt based cathode which is not as 
thermally stable as LFP [16]. A number of safety mechanisms [17] are often included in 18650 cells 
used in consumer products for low voltage systems. An example of such a safety mechanism is the 
current interrupture device (CID). The CID is a disc which is part of the current pathway. In case of 
overpressure in the cell, the CID is mechanically released due to the pressure, letting the cell go into 
open circuit mode. The CID is typically activated at a predesigned stage, before the cell can go into 
thermal runaway, by using shutdown additives [18]. PTC (positive temperature coefficient) is another 
safety mechanism, which protects the cell by rapidly increasing the resistance in the current pathway 
when trigged by an overtemperature, significantly lowering the current passing through the cell. 
Anyhow, the CID and PTC do not work that well in battery systems with  multiple cells electrically 
connected in series and thereby a  higher voltage [19] e.g. in batteries used in electrified vehicles. 
Figure 11 shows a cross-section X-ray photo of a 18650 cell where PTC and CID are shown. 
 
 
Figure 11 X-ray photo of a 18650 cell with the PTC and CID marked. 
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Shutdown separators are widely used in commercial Li-ion batteries as a safety protection for some 
abuse situations, e.g. overcharge and short circuit. The pores in the separator are closed at 
overtemperatures which lead to a hindered ion transport between cathode and anode and thus an open 
circuit. The shutdown separator usually consists of a layered structure where one layer has a lower 
melting temperature than the other layer. When the first layer melts the pores in the separator are 
closed, while the second layer sustains the cell integrity thereby prohibiting internal short circuit. 
Figure 12 shows DSC measurements of a polypropylene (PP) separator and of a shutdown separator 
with polyethylene (PE) and PP, the latter exhibits two melting temperatures, corresponding to the two 
materials. In case of e.g. an overcharge leading to an increased cell temperature, the PE will melt at 
around 130 °C, lowering the current and thereby the heating process. It may work less well in some 
situations e.g. when the current is interrupted too late or when the cooling is poor due to the battery 
system design. In those cases the melting temperature, around 160°C, of the second layer of PP can be 
reached leading to the total disintegration of the separator followed by an internal cell short circuit. 
The use of shutdown separators in large battery systems has shown not to have the same safety 
benefits as in small batteries. When many cells are electrical connected in series (forming a cell 
string) it causes the voltage to increase which in turn can also lead to separator breakdown [20]. 
 
 
Figure 12 DSC measurements of two different separator materials, one shutdown separator 
with PE-PP and one with only PP. The DSC measurements used a liquid N2 cooled  
Mettler DSC-30, the samples were purged with N2, and heated between 25 °C and 
185 °C with a heating rate of 5 °C/min. 
 
In order to account for the drawback that some of the typical safety devices used in cells for consumer 
products cannot be used in Li-ion cells for electrified vehicles, other safety mechanisms such as 
special additives in the electrolyte are used. Li-ion cells for xEV typically uses cells which higher 
quality in manufacturing with more pure raw materials and safer chemistry like the LFP which can 
withstand abuse better. Figure 13 shows 2 C-rate overcharging of four LFP based cells with a capacity 
between 7-45 Ah. The GBS cell has a cathode of LFMP, i.e. LFP with manganese. The charger 
voltage was max 15.3 V and the charger was active during the complete test. The temperatures 
reached less than 80 °C, well below the onset temperature of the thermal runaway.  However, the cells 
swell and gases are emitted. Four European battery cells were tested and the result from one of them 
is shown in Figure 13. Actually one of the European Battery cell unexpectedly caught fire. A situation 
of an overcharge abuse in the field might occur in case of a failure in the battery management system 
(BMS). High charge currents can occur e.g. during fast charging or during breaking (recuperation) of 
a xEV which makes those cases especially sensitive to errors in the overcharge protection. In 
principle, the consequences for overcharging of LFP cells are less dramatic than for other Li-ion 
chemistries but the temperature increase starts at a lower state of overcharge [16]. 
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Figure 13  Overcharge tests of LFP and LFMP cells, with charge current of 2 C-rate. 
 
In case of a short circuit of a Li-ion battery the current can be very high. Measurements of a low-
ohmic short circuit on a single pouch cell from European Battery are shown in Figure 14. The voltage 
and current were measured with 1 kHz by an oscilloscope and cell surface temperatures (by eighteen 
type K thermocouples on both sides of the cell) by a data logger at 1 Hz. The short circuit peak 
current is close to 1100 A and then lowered to a plateau of about 700 A. High currents generates a lot 
of heat but for this cell the temperature increase is only about 5 °C since the short circuit is stopped 
when the positive terminal burns off from the cell. In case of a large battery pack with cell terminals 
that do not burn off, the current and the generated heat can be substantial and in case of burnt off 
terminal tabs the flames might ignite vented flammable battery gases or plastic parts inside a battery 
system. 
 
 
Figure 14 Short circuit of a European Battery pouch cell. 
 
 
BATTERY SYSTEM AND ELECTRIFIED VEHICLE LEVEL 
 
High battery safety is accomplished by using many layers of actions of various safety techniques. 
Figure 15  shows the safety-onion with examples of diverse safety actions used to ensure a low 
probability for fault and to minimize the consequences of a fault. Firstly, the cell chemistry is 
essential since this is the basis of the thermal stability. Secondly comes the cell design and packaging.  
In principle there are three main levels; cell, battery system and vehicle level. 
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Figure 15 The safety-onion showing examples of layer by layer of different safety actions that can 
be used to establish a safe battery system in electrified vehicles. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
There is a relatively good knowledge about the safety risks and safety devices used in consumer cells. 
Using Li-ion in the automotive sector puts higher demands on the battery since the batteries are 
significantly larger and with harsher environmental conditions, e.g. vibrations, humidity, larger 
temperature variations. The different Li-ion chemistries show diverse hazards where the LFP is less 
reactive but still safety measures are needed for all Li-ion batteries. High safety is achieved by adding 
several safety layers from cell to vehicle level, however the risk for a cascading fire in a complete 
battery pack starting from a single cell is not yet well studied and the knowledge about possible 
counteractions is thus also limited. Sometimes things go wrong even though smart safety strategies 
are used. The exploded cylindrical cell due to a cell vent malfunction showed this and this fact 
underlines the importance of using many safety layers. 
 
The toxic gas emissions from Li-ion batteries, e.g. HF and POF3, can pose a serious risk for persons. 
A replacement of the Li-salt LiPF6 to a non-fluorine salt and change of fluorine binder could resolve 
this risk. Intense research is ongoing in this field but the required properties for a Li-ion battery in a 
xEVs are complex and demanding. 
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